A long-standing principle of patent systems is that the patent holder can decide whom to license based on the field-of-use  and what to ask, creating a mechanism to price differentiate, that is, to charge different prices for the same patented technology, depending on the value of its use.

Such a mechanism allows the patented technology to be distributed (allocated) through markets to a maximum number of competing and non-competing users (firms), at prices based on the (risky and uncertain) value of their future use (in new innovations), adding to the revenues (and likely profits) of inventors.

We examine this principle by means of a literature review and discuss, both in a short-run static and a long-run dynamic setting, the economic efficiency of such price differentiation (price ‘discrimination’ in the economic literature) by field-of-use with respect to licensing contracts concerning patents essential to a standard,2 that is, Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions.

Article ref.: Ullberg, 2019, Economic efficiency and field-of-use pricing of SEP licences under FRAND terms, Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property, Vol. 9 No. 4, pp. 392–413

DOI:https://doi.org/10.4337/qmjip.2019.04.02

Also available at: 4iP Council’s web page.

Abstract

This article is concerned with the producer market in patented technology, and whether price differentiation based on field-of-use – a common strategy adopted by businesses with high fixed costs – is economically efficient. The focus is on the licensing of Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions, including also the Internet of Things (IoT) applications, and the economic growth in the digital economy, especially for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). The central argument proposed is that the absolute difference in the value between usages of essential standardized technologies determines whether a single price for all usages or specific field-of-use prices are economically efficient. A small difference in value should result in a single price and a large difference in different prices. Pricing policy is critical to create a world-wide sustained technology development including contributions from, and applications for, emerging markets and developed markets, thereby growing the digital economy.

In this literature review, three evaluation angles of the literature are used: a market analysis under neo-classical assumptions of price-taking agents and marginal (incremental) value; an expanded market analysis where the willingness to pay (WTP) replaces marginal cost as criteria for what price should be paid for licences; and an analysis of market designs with similar characteristics as the SEP market in terms of risk, using experimental economics (behavioural) and auction theory. All analyses angles investigate the principle of field-of-use licensing, established already in the first known patent law in 1474.

Why are inventors willing to take more risk in searching for new, more productive technology? This article examines coordination between inventors inventing and innovators in need for and using new patented technology, using an economic experiment.

The results indicate that the institutional arrangements matter more than enforcement in this learning process. In particular increased flexibility in demand side bidding yields higher willingness to search. This has implications on patent trade policy: Both the institutional and enforcement has to be considered in order to get a good selection process of what inventions to further invest in.

Read article for free here or download from Journal of the Knowledge Economy here.

How should services be priced? This article outlines five steps towards a service logic driven by changes in IP and deregulation of major economic activities.

Article was published in Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance in 2002 and  can be found at Geneva Associations.